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to a small number of heavily studied global cities in the West (also see Robinson, 2015) . This combination has helped to stimulate more research on more cities in the Global South in their own historical and geographical contexts, as well as along and beyond their path-dependent trajectories.
Both perspectives above provide complementary guidance for rethinking border cities. A different view from a familiar scholar (Sassen, 2013) has also offered new insights on border cities. Further challenging that the state has exclusive authority over its territory, Sassen (2008) has demonstrated that varied global or denationalizing dynamics have deeply embedded themselves inside the state's borders and thus eroded the latter and their legally based territoriality from within. While global finance clustered in global cities is a familiar example of entrenched anti-state power, weakened state control over borders exposes citizens and migrants to more risks like illicit activities stemming from easier border crossings. Yet does this unbalanced outcome of power hold when a strong state is capable of projecting inside-out power through its strategic border cities? This question directs our focus back to how border cities themselves act as active agents or urban gateways in channeling and redistributing state power while funneling more mobile and less loyal citizens across porous borders.
Mobilities across new in-between spaces
To characterize borderlands as in-between spaces is not really new. Many scholars have pointed out that borderlands are both divided and united by national territories on both sides given the historical legacy of colonialism that has redrawn political boundaries, the continued social construction of borders and their meanings, and increased cross-border flows in the age of globalization (see Banerjee and Chen, 2013 ). Yet two forces can inject new dynamism and volatility into well-established and relatively stable borderlands bounded by local and internal conditions. One is the rapid growth of small border cities into new hubs capable of exerting much greater influence on the entire borderland and beyond. The other is the shift in the relative power of national and local states across the borderline that can tilt the direction and strength of economic influence from one side to the other. Both forces combine to shake up a given borderland by altering the triangular relationship between the state, the (border) city and the citizen, which in turn reshapes the scope and velocity of cross-border mobility and then creates a new spatial pattern of uneven development, with unequal costs and benefits.
The recent rise of some border cities, while having a lot to do with globalization, has occurred through the simultaneous shift of their national and regional contexts. Previously, almost all border cities were subject to certain unfavorable conditions such as marginal locations, small populations and markets, insufficient support from national governments, less developed transport infrastructure, and likely cross-border conflicts. These conditions tend to constrain the otherwise advantageous opportunities for border cities to thrive, including strategic locations as customs checkpoints, convenient exposure to cross-border mobility, and benefits from spatially contiguous and adjacent trade routes, historical connections, migration circuits, and ethnic ties, which constitute a sort of collective social capital (Chen, 2000 (Chen, , 2005 . The balance of these conditions and factors differentiates border cities' level and stage of development and inward (national and regional) vs. outward (global) impact.
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The relatively closed interaction between these conditions at the national and regional level has been disrupted by the growing impact of globalization and its regional and local penetration circumventing varied levels of national territorial regulation and border control. This outside-in influence has converged with the inside-out policies of states to open up border cities to more trade, foreign investment, and cross-border tourism, and build up their infrastructure to enhance the positive effects of these economic flows. This convergence has led to de-bordering, characterized by borders shifting from a barrier role to a bridging one that turns some marginal and remote border cities into dynamic and networked centers for the larger borderlands. Despite simultaneous rebordering, which refers to the state (re)imposing control or regulation over borders so as to stem negative effects including terrorist activities and illegal crossings such as drugs and human trafficking (Chen, 2013) , the rise of border cities has benefited from the stronger process of de-bordering relative to re-bordering, that is, more openness than closure. This dynamic parallels and contributes to more varied and multiplied borderings that further denationalize the state and create new local assemblages of the global (Sassen, 2008) .
As a result of the push and pull of de-bordering and re-bordering, via both state-directed and market-driven globalization, the more important cities have taken on two key new dimensions. First, they have strengthened and intensified cross-border mobility as larger hubs and wider channels. The newer and more connected infrastructure (border economic zones and new highways to and through borders) built by the state allows greater and denser flows of goods, services, and people across the enlarged borderland. Second, border cities have gained more autonomy and influence vs. their states and citizens in the triangle discussed earlier. While both dimensions facilitate more cross-border and mutually beneficial cooperation, they generate not only friction against greater mobility, but also conflict among stronger but unequal actors, due to the uneven distribution of economic mobility and political power. It is this contradictory co-existence that renders the border cities in this chapter a new kind of in-between space.
What does mobility look like in this in-between space? Or, more broadly, does this inbetween space pluralize and concretize mobility in ways to create new flows? Who shapes the meaning of these mobilities? What are their new drivers? Where are the anchors or moorings for them? Besides the greater density and volume of traditional cross-border flows of trade and visitors, new forces shaping cross-border mobilities in Asia have emanated from larger global concerns and contexts of geopolitics and geoeconomics (Lin and Yeoh, 2016) . China again looms large and projects widespread footprints stretching and stitching previously unconnected and weakly connected cross-national border regions. These take the forms of long-distance cargo movement across the vast Eurasian land mass (Chen and Mardeusz, 2015) and lengthy oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia to China's east coast (Fazilov and Chen, 2013) . In a large-scale parallel move through its land borders with Southeast Asia, China has extended some tentacles of transport infrastructure (roads and high-speed train) into Myanmar and Laos via the key border cities (Chen and Stone, 2013) . This has invited some resistance to what is perceived as topdown inter-government policies to dictate cross-border mobilities (Lin and Yeoh, 2016) . As anchors and nodes for these new mobilities reshaping the traditional borderland into new in-between spaces, the border cities between China and Southeast Asia constitute the main focus and locus of inquiry.
Border cItIes Between chIna and southeast asIa
The multinational urban and regional contexts Before probing the deeper causes and wider consequences of the border cities as a new in-between space, it is necessary to highlight the status of these cities conditioned by the national pattern of urbanization in China and the Southeast Asian countries in question. While the level of urbanization in the GMS has been relatively low, there is a persistent dominance of a few major cities that are also capitals of their respective countries. Table 26 .2 displays the ratio of the capital cities' population to the total urban population in these countries. The data confirm the disproportionately large size and weight of the capital cities. Besides the extreme primacy of Bangkok, Phnom Penh accounted for about half of Cambodia's total urban population around the year 2000. Over time, however, the demographic dominance of these cities declined and their dominance is projected to drop further as secondary and ever-smaller cities grow more rapidly. This accelerationdeceleration logic is beginning to reflect the shifts in the relative balance of influence that change over time in the triangular relationship model. The relatively low level of urbanization overall coupled with the dominance of a few capital cities in the GMS means that only a handful of urban centers have more diversified functions and that most other relatively small cities are narrowly specialized in single sectors like trade, transportation, and tourism, with little manufacturing strength and weak physical connectivity to project their influence very far. They are also spread unevenly over large distances and thus incapable of generating many economic linkages and spillovers within and across the borders and border regions of the GMS countries. It is this vacuum of cross-border regional dominance by large urban centers that has created an opening for the only real power in the region -China -to step in with its targeted and timely initiative to produce a new regional zone of cross-cutting power and influence.
China's cross-border regional reach
Yunnan Province and its border cities were important trade outposts historically. Yunnan's active historical role in border trade, however, stagnated from the Cultural Revolution (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) to the early 1980s, when coastal provinces and cities were heavily favored over inland border provinces. While Yunnan's international trade rose from The onset of the 2000s saw the launch of China's 'Go West' campaign, which was designed to shift investment and development weight to the relatively underdeveloped interior and border regions. This large-scale policy shift at the central level unleashed a new wave of opportunities for Yunnan to expand its cross-border regional cooperation. On May 6, 2011, China's State Council issued, 'Supporting the Accelerated Construction of Yunnan as the Important Outpost for the Southwest Region,' which tasked the capital city of Kunming to become the international hub and 'bridgehead' for China's southwestern region facing the GMS. Symbolically, Yunnan's tallest building has risen in Kunming's Panlong district, which will serve as the financial and commercial zone for the local presence and regional expansion of multinational companies.
Kunming was a scenic but sleepy and historic but less developed provincial city through the early 2000s. Since then it has been pushed by both Beijing and Yunnan to become a much more powerful international metropolis that will spread and distribute growth benefits to and around the smaller secondary cities in Yunnan, at the same time projecting long-distance influences over the border to the GMS. To extend Kunming's influence in the direction of the GMS countries south and west of the border, the Yunnan government approved the establishment of six border economic cooperation zones in May 2012, including one around the city of Tengchong (see Figure 26 .1), giving them the autonomy to offer financial incentives and approve investment projects. This provincial initiative augmented the central government's approval of opening three border economic cooperation zones in the cities of Ruili, Wanding, and Hekou in 1992 when the GMS was launched.
The Yunnan-Myanmar border zone
The city of Ruili located in Yunnan Province is a major border crossing between China and Myanmar. Of the growing number of cooperation zones along the extensive ChinaSoutheast Asia borderland, the Ruili-Muse zone stands out as the most established and important case for studying how mobility is shaped by the power between the state, city, and citizen that is distributed across and lodged deep inside an in-between space. This in-between space called Ruili, located at the tip of Guomen (National Gate) Avenue just across a portion of the Ruili River that is entirely in Chinese territory yet also at the edge of Myanmar, is indeed the southwest doorway to China. The mobilities of people and goods in this dynamic cross-national realm, however, have been intensified and accelerated by both convergence and contestation among new state policies, more autonomous localities, and diverse residents and migrants. All this has converted a bordered zone into a more in-between space with the blurring of separate yet interrelated national and local interests.
Ruili's role as a key city for stimulating lagged economic development in its border region and for bridging the latter with the neighboring Southeast Asian economies began when the city created the Jiegao Border Economic Development Zone in 1991 to facilitate trade with Muse on the Myanmar side. Jiegao's role for economic development was further elevated when a special export processing zone policy was implemented in 2000. In more recent years Ruili's importance has moved far beyond a mere border market. This bustling city with a large international population has become more regionally linked to China's overall strategic plan to develop its vast western region while extending its influence across its borders, and thus both the central and local governments have been building Ruili up to a regional hub. For example, the Master Plan of the Ruili Experimental Zone, which was approved by China's National Development and Reform Commission on August 12, 2013, included 238 projects intended to boost Ruili as a gathering place and gateway for economic activities and flows with the neighboring Southeast Asian economies. One such project was a new oil/gas pipeline from western Myanmar into Yunnan (Chen, 2015) .
Major infrastructure investment over the years has strengthened Ruili's role as an increasingly open, though rather complicated, land port. Cross-border travel has been largely encouraged by Chinese authorities, dependent on the security situation in Myanmar, and the zone has become a testing ground for cross-border finances. Strong cross-border intercourse has created numerous economic opportunities, transforming this once sleepy border town with a sparse population into a lively city with a population size (160,000) about equal to that of New Haven, Connecticut (Figure 26.2) .
On the other side of the border Myanmar is also making efforts to gain influence over this cross-national zone. In addition to the huge 150 hectare border trade zone set up in Muse to facilitate trade with China, Myanmar has also been connecting Muse to Mandalay, the country's second largest city. Not only is Mandalay the second largest city in Myanmar but it borders Thailand, an economic giant in Southeast Asia. To better connect the Ruili-Muse zone to the Mandalay-Thailand zone overland, Myanmar upgraded the 460 km road that connects the border town to the city. This upgrade not only reduced the travel time from up to a week to 12-16 hours, but also made the longer journey from Muse to Myanmar's capital city of Yangon in the south much more convenient. Now Myanmar traders operating in the space between Muse and Ruili can board a long-distance bus and get to Yangon in about 24 hours, and many traders do in fact make this trip on a regular basis. While the road conditions between Muse and Mandalay (and Yangon) are not as good as between Ruili and Yunnan's capital city of Kunming, their improvement has nevertheless elevated Muse's important role as a regional hub.
The Yunnan-Laos border region
Compared to the established trade-centric border ties between China and Myanmar, the Yunnan-Laos border region features weaker but growing connections. Like Mandalay in Myanmar, Laos itself serves as a type of overland passageway that connects China to Thailand as well as other Southeast Asian countries including Vietnam. From Jinghong, the largest city in Xishuangbanna and the seat of government from which Xishuangbanna (Sipsongpanna) Dai Autonomous Prefecture exercises its authority, one can get to a small city called Mengla by bus in about four hours. From there one can easily reach the border town of Mohan located at the China-Laos border (see Figure 26 .1). Mohan is the gateway to China from Laos. Whereas Ruili connects China to a changing Myanmar and provides China with raw materials and access to the Indian Ocean, Laos supplies China with raw materials and access to larger Southeast Asia.
The importance of Laos as a supplier of key resources as well as its importance as a major land route to Southeast Asia has encouraged the Chinese government to build up this cross-border space. For example, in late 2015 China announced an investment of $31.4 billion to build a 4,500 km 2 pilot economic zone on the border with Laos in an economic development park in Mohan in order to boost the two-sided development. At the time of the announcement more than 240 projects in fields ranging from transportation to education and energy were included. In addition, under construction in this zone is a railway linking two important cities in Yunnan: Yuxi (about 90 km south of Kunming) and Mohan (gateway to Laos), and there is planned preparation for a new airport at Mengla. The railway and airport are expected to be in use by 2020.
Before the formal start of these ambitious projects that will project and propel China's influence into Laos and other parts of Southeast Asia even further, we find an existing paved road built by China that already connects Boten to Luang Namtha, the capital of Luang Namtha Province in northern Laos and a large settlement north of Luang Prabang, which then stretches 630 km all the way to Vientiane, the capital of Laos. To give a sense of how this border zone is becoming more of an extension of China than a shared space, we find that China's cell phone service extends about 6 km into Laos, just like it does from Ruili into Muse over the border. As Stone observed during his field work in 2013, the deeper one goes into Laos from Boten, the more the mountains look stripped of their trees because of China's huge appetite for lumber. And in Luang Namtha, you will find many shops that sell Chinese goods as well as various Chinese-owned and operated businesses, including a motorcycle store and a hotel. While all this may appear as China pushing its influence across the border with Myanmar and Laos, it has actually left new footprints and expanded facilities of economic activities and transport and communication infrastructure that characterize the growing border cities. Moreover, these cities have been stretched by state-directed accelerated development on and from both sides of the borders into larger regional spaces overarching traditional discrete local places (the old border cities) and their extended activities. This alerts us to the emergence of new trans-border regional nuances that should be spatially classified and more deeply analyzed.
actors fIllIng the In-Between spaces
As the description above indicates, both border regions are characterized by the strong and uneven Chinese influence originating from China's and Yunnan's policies to connect more strongly with Southeast Asia through improving the conditions and extending the reach of border cities. China's cross-border influence in Myanmar and Laos has grown via: (a) the amassing of economic activities from institutional arrangements like the wellsupported border zones; and (b) the spatial spread and extension of economic reach through large-scale transport infrastructure (highways and railways) from inside China and Yunnan Province all the way into the border regions of and farther afield inside Myanmar and Laos. While weaker and more passive in responding to China's crossborder influence, both Myanmar and Laos have engaged with it in ways that have thrust their border zones and cities into a broader in-between space filled with greater mobilities and more contentious politics.
From a more conventional interstate perspective, we can take the empirical analysis of this phenomenon in the direction of better understanding the sub-regional dimensions of cross-border relations between China and Myanmar and Laos, respectively. While this analysis can shed new light on how informal regionalism and simultaneous de-bordering and re-bordering lead to both integration and fragmentation of traditional borderlands (see Chen, 2013) , it is not sufficient for rethinking border cities as a kind of in-between space that reshapes mobility and governance. To secure this new analytical purpose, we use a tripartite analytical approach to examine the relative role of the state, city, and citizen in reshaping the border cities and mobility between China's southwestern region and mainland Southeast Asia.
Three key actors in cross-border space
The state at the national and local level, together with the citizen, are three critical actors that shape cross-border spaces and mobilities, even though the relative power of each vs. the other two varies a lot across the combined historical, geographical, and socio-cultural conditions of cross-border spaces. While the national state is usually the most powerful actor as the shaper and enforcer of border policy, the state's capacity to control more open 490 borders under globalization has been eroded, leading not only to a further decoupling of national political and territorial integrity, but also to greater trans-border mobility, especially between physically linked border cities. As a result of this intentional and reactive decentralization initiated by the national state, the local state at the border has become relatively more autonomous in determining trans-boundary mobilities. Despite being subordinate to both the central and local state, the citizen in border cities has become more mobile and active in initiating and changing cross-border flows. Additionally, the citizen in border cities often relies on unique national networks that may differ from those of the dominant nationality of the state, making consistent top-down control much harder.
To unpack this shifting relationship among the three actors, we see the conventionally more powerful actor -the nation state (of China in particular) -taking on a new dimension in relating to its subnational units, the latter's cross-border counterparts, and their citizens. While we expect some rescaling of the Chinese state's power (Brenner, 2004) in this cross-border space, it is somewhat unexpected to witness the Chinese state scaling 'down and out' using both institutional and infrastructure mechanisms. By decentralizing and relocating development priority to southwestern Yunnan and its border region, the Chinese government has 'scaled down' administrative decision making to allow this underdeveloped frontier to catch up. By building Kunming and Ruili into more open outposts facing Southeast Asia, the national and provincial governments have 'scaled out' or projected out economic influence into the border zones of Myanmar and Laos and beyond. The most effective institutional mechanism for facilitating both forms of rescaling of China's economic engagement with the Myanmar and Laos border regions is the special border zones in Ruili and Mohan. In parallel, China has created a powerful channel by building and extending large-scale transport and infrastructure tentacles in multiple cross-border directions, with a newly built oil and gas pipeline from the port city of Kyaukphyu on Myanmar's west coast to Kunming and a planned railway that may reach from Kunming all the way to Laos' capital city of Vientiane (see below). This stretches the mobility of goods and natural resources across more places and longer distances through rural landscapes, creating new frontier urban footprints and thus offering a kind of supportive evidence for Brenner's planetary urbanization thesis.
While the nation state is the primary actor in the tri-actor relationship with the strongest effect on the direction and balance of mobilities in cross-border space, the (border) city acts as the primary site and vehicle for these mobilities. In addition, the border city is the direct actor for implementing any national and provincial policies intended to make different border cities more prosperous and cooperative with one another. Even more importantly, the border city is the actual producer of economic growth and also serves to distribute the benefits from new development and greater mobility. In the state-citycitizen scheme for understanding mobility, the city occupies the crucial middle layer that is capable of aligning macro state policies from national and provincial capitals with the microeconomic interests of citizens across border cities. Unlike cities in interior regions where they interact and compete with many others in closer geographical proximity, border cities between China and Myanmar/Laos are few and far between and thus play a disproportionally greater role in shaping the development of cross-border space. In other words, the border city 'scales up' the new cross-border mobility of people and wealth unleashed by targeted state policies and citizens' grassroots activities.
Despite being heavily constrained by the combined institutional power of the state and the city, the citizen is released and empowered by the larger and freer cross-border 491 space resulting from more open borders and denser economic ties. Two other factors also enhance the role of citizens in remaking the cross-border space into more lively binational places to their advantage. One is the deep-rooted historical, cultural, ethnic, and migratory ties binding people on both sides of the border including those between China and Myanmar/Laos. The other and related factor is the more flexible and fluid identity of border residents with their less aligned national politics and territories (Chen, 2005) . Under these multiple favorable conditions, the relative importance of citizens has risen through the aggregated impact of their varied individual activities in border trade and tourist visits. It constitutes the bottom-up force that further scales up and densifies cross-border mobilities relative to the top-down push by both the national and local state.
As each of the three actors has become stronger in the more interactive cross-border environment, they are more capable of reaching farther into both sides of the borderline and stretching it. Given the unequal power and uneven influence of these actors vis-à-vis their cross-border counterpart at each of the three levels, there are more complex interactions across boundaries that add more fissures and fusions, thus reinforcing the in-betweenness of the re-bordered spaces.
The Ruili-Muse border zone in larger context: unequal power and uneven development
From the three-actor framework discussed above, an analysis of the Ruili-Muse border zone (see Figure 26 .1) will reveal its complexity with regard to the main drivers and outcomes of stretched mobilities in a reorganized cross-border space. This analysis, however, will fall short without taking into account the larger context of China- In value terms, transit trade across the Yunnan border accounts for over half of ChinaMyanmar trade. Over 80% of Myanmar's exports to China and 40% of its imports from China come across Yunnan's border (Singh, 2016 ). Myanmar's trade with China accounts for 87% of its border trade, much larger than its trade with Thailand, at a distant second of 12%. But border trade did not become dominant in China-Myanmar's overall trade overnight. From 1992 to 2004, China's average share in Myanmar's total cross-border trade was about 63.2%, whereas Yunnan's shares of Myanmar's total exports and imports were 59.0% and 70%, respectively (Than, 2005: 43) . These statistics confirm that longestablished border trade is the foundation for understanding mobility across the ChinaMyanmar border zone. Without serious trade, there would be no reason for China and Myanmar to support and develop this in-between space.
Of the all the border trading posts between China and Myanmar, none has more volume and vibrancy than the twin cities of Ruili and Muse. Ruili is China's and Yunnan's most important and dominant location for trade with Myanmar, while Muse has been Myanmar's busiest among its 15 border trading stations facing China, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Laos. As of mid-November 2015, Myanmar's border trade at Muse rose 493 family has been in the jade trade for generations. While examining various pieces of raw jade in his shop office, he said, 'Chinese people didn't just start to like jade. They have always liked jade and used it for thousands of years.' He went on, 'Our business depends mainly on China though since other countries are not as fond of jade as the Chinese.'
3 The scale and centrality of jade trade in Ruili struck us in the face during our research field trip there in 2013. Jade trade, almost by itself, has elevated this once sleepy town to a vibrant city by attracting a large number of outside traders on both sides of the border. The physical jade market, which literally straddles the border, has turned into a large in-between space where the buying and selling with long-distance sourcing and marketing ties now define and dominate the borderland.
Jade trade aside, the fruit business has become another mechanism to stretch and reconfigure the in-between spaces and cross-border mobility. Myanmar companies based in Muse township used to buy fruit from growers in Tada-Oo, Myittha, and Kyaukse in Mandalay and as far as from Yangon. The fruit business in Muse has done well, with workers from all over Myanmar making good money from around 1,000 trucks that deliver daily. Since 2012 when Chinese traders first entered the Muse trading zone, they have slowly taken over the fruit market. 'China is very prominent here and influences all the markets in Muse. Chinese businesspeople are engaged in both imports and exports,' said the owner of Khwar fruit retail shop. He said, 'The brokers, owners and shareholders are all Chinese, but the ordinary workers are Myanmar.' 4 The most important shift is that Chinese fruit traders have extended their operation deeper into Shan State instead of dealing with Myanmar middlemen at the Muse border post. 'Now, Chinese brokers are connecting directly with the farmers, giving them money, equipment, and seeds. This is making life hard for small local traders,' said U Sai Khin Maung, secretary of the Muse fruit retailers' association. 'They profit on both sides of the border, buying fruit cheaply in Myanmar and selling it on in China.' 'Local farmers are happy to do business with the Chinese brokers because they can continue to farm their own land with Chinese technology and they have access to a good market,' he said. However, Chinese buyers could later lower the prices local farmers were prepared to pay. If that happens, he was concerned that his organization might not then be in a position to help the farmers. 5 Additionally, many Myanmar citizens in the border region have strong Chinese ties, perhaps a generation or so apart, making it even easier for savvy Chinese to exploit this cross-border ethnic network.
Moving beyond their traditional space of operation in the border city, Chinese fruit traders have stretched their mobility and thus enlarged their role in reshaping the cross-border fruit market in their favor. In doing so, they have also created a new and larger in-between economic space inside Myanmar's national territory. This is akin to pushing the in-between space at the border to farther beyond. The forward shift of the in-between space from the border is also accompanied by a more unequal economic practice that benefits Chinese fruit brokers at some expense of Myanmar fruit farmers.
In the other direction, businesspeople from Myanmar entering China legally are given a renewable border pass. They are treated very much like local Chinese citizens, provided they remain in the special border zone, and are allowed to live and work on both sides of the border. All they need is an ID card, nothing else. The process of entering China via the land border in Jiegao is a painless formality. For 2 RMB ($.30), Myanmar citizens are given a border passbook that is limited to seven days but it can be renewed 494 when requested. As long as the passbooks is valid and up to date, there is no limit to how long a Myanmar citizen can stay in China. That is, they are able to carry out their business in China without any major issues; however, the border pass is limited to Yunnan's Dehong Prefecture only. While convenient, China really has no choice. It is very difficult to control such a large, porous border in which various peoples are used to crossing the border for personal and business reasons, and making it difficult or too troublesome may just encourage more people to cross the border illegally. But China has made it easy for Myanmar citizens to live and do business in this in-between space and respects their rights. For example, one successful Myanmar citizen who does business in the border zone (and was interviewed) had lived there for years without issue and was married to a Chinese citizen.
Myanmar make up about 30% of Ruili's population (Figure 26 .2), and about 70% of that percentage are from Rakhine State. That is to say, the majority of the Myanmar population in Ruili are Muslim and mostly stateless because of political persecution back in Myanmar. From those we interviewed, who by the way where very interested in our presence and happy to be interviewed, we learned that Muslims feel safe in China and are treated well by the local government of Ruili. In Ruili, most can be seen engaging in the jade business. The money they earn is not sent back through formal channels, for instance via bank wire transfers. Instead, the money they earn in China is sent back to friends and family in Myanmar using what they call a 'friend to friend' network, which helps them avoid fees. On average, Myanmar citizens engaged in the jade business in China can make 3000 RMB ($500) a month. For comparison, this is what a migrant worker working a service job in Beijing might earn each month, and Beijing is much costlier. To ensure money is not wasted, it is common for five people to share a single-room apartment in Ruili, the rent of which is 500 RMB ($80) a month and includes electricity and water.
At the border gate, we interviewed a young woman from Muse who crosses the border every day to work in a hotel bookstore right at the border in a special zone that is in Chinese territory but also considered international. She is third-generation Myanmar. Her grandparents went to Muse, and she speaks Chinese. Working at the bookstore, she makes 2800 RMB ($400) a month, a relatively high salary that may have do with a possible relative connection. Another young woman we interviewed in a small, privately owned bookstore located on a street in Ruili was from Lashio, which is about 115 km from the border. Unlike the first young woman who crossed the border daily, she lived in China and made 1000 RMB ($150) a month. Elsewhere in town, we found that 80% of the workers at a Chinese furniture factory are from Myanmar as the owner has been encouraged to hire them by the local government.
6 Local government agencies have also begun to offer Chinese-language instruction to these long-term residents from Myanmar who realize its importance.
The Mohan-Boten border area: In the shadow of a new cross-border railway
Compared to the scale and diversity of economic activities linking the China-Myanmar border cities, the cities, or really towns, on the China-Laos border host smaller populations and more limited activities. Mohan's one long street stretches to the border gate that leads right up to the Laos border town of Boten (see Figure 26 .1). Along this street one can find an official money exchange building where the Chinese RMB currency can be exchanged for the Lao kip currency freely and easily, as well as people outside offering to exchange money for a fee. Once you cross the border into Boten, there are many Lao locals who speak Chinese and offer car services. Many Chinese businesspeople and tourists come across the border here on long-distance buses from cities such as Kunming and Jinghong before continuing on to their final destination, which may be in Laos or in another part of Southeast Asia. Boten was once infamous for gambling and other vices. The project that transformed this once-backward area into a beehive of economic activity was known as Golden Boten City. What followed was the proliferation of gaming halls, prostitutes, pawn shops, and pharmacies. Today, Boten is something of a 'ghost town' with visible leftover Chinese influence (see Figure 26 .4) as opposed to a once more lively city, though a large Chinese-run hotel still operates in the area. According to one of our interviewees there, the lawless city was shut down by China because Chinese were killing Chinese over the lucrative, once lawless, space. 
